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Abstract
We study, with daily and monthly data sets, the impact of conventional monetary policy measures such
as interest rates, intervention and other quantitative measures, and of Central Bank communication on
exchange rate volatility. Since India has a managed float, we also test if the measures affect the level of
the exchange rate. Using dummy variables in the best of an estimated family of GARCH models, we find
forex market intervention to be the most effective of all the CB instruments evaluated for the period of
analysis. We also find that CB communication has a large potential but was not effectively used.
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Research  on  monetary  policy  has  seen  exponential  growth,  but  the  rich  and  challenging 
experiences in emerging markets are still under-explored. In this paper we estimate the best 
model  in  the  family  of  autoregressive  conditional  heterosckedasticity  (ARCH)  and 
generalized ARCH (GARCH) models of exchange rate volatility, for the period following 
maturing of Indian policy, money and FX markets. Then we insert policy dummies to study 
the impact on exchange rate volatility of conventional monetary policy measures such as 
interest rates, intervention and other quantitative measures, and of Central Bank (Reserve 
Bank of India, RBI) communication
1. Since India has a managed float, it is worthwhile to test 
if the measures also affect the level of the exchange rate. 
 
This is a rich period to analyze the effectiveness of various instruments since the movement 
towards freer markets implies a large range of policy instruments continue to be used. An 
assessment of their relative impact is a contribution towards understanding transition and 
towards  determining  the  way  forward.  In  an  emerging  markets  facing  potential  market 
instability from volatile capital flows, alternative instruments can give valuable degrees of 
freedom to the Central Bank. 
 
In  the  past  decade,  India  has  seen  rapid  development  in  markets,  institutions  and  in 
instruments of monetary policy. A liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) has been introduced 
and the overnight inter-bank loan rate (the call money rate) has largely been kept in a band 
between  two  policy  rates  through i n j e c t i o n s  a n d  a b s o r p t i o n s  o f  l i q u i d i t y  ( G h o s h  a n d  
Bhattacharya, 2009).  
 
                                                 
1 Fišer and Horváth (2010) use policy dummies in an equation for exchange rate volatility, and Ghosh and 
Bhattacharya (2009) do so in a GARCH model of the money market. 
  1In India, monetary policy follows a multiple indicator approach, thus giving weight to both 
inflation and growth. Though RBI is not formally independent, series of measures have been 
taken to grant greater independence after the liberalizing reforms of the early nineties
2. A 
populous low per capita income democracy, where inflation is a politically sensitive issue, 
requires a rapid response by monetary authorities to contain inflationary expectations. At the 
same time, developmental issues cannot be ignored.  
 
The stated aim of Indian exchange rate policy is to reduce volatility, while the level is market 
determined around fundamentals. The period under analysis has seen movement away from a 
fixed exchange rate, relaxation of controls on the current account of the balance of payments, 
and partial capital account convertibility. There are no restrictions on equity flows. Surges in 
inflows have created problems for monetary management. Despite a current account deficit, 
reserves crossed $300 billion mark in 2008. Development of foreign exchange markets has 
been rapid. The average daily turnover in Indian FX markets, which was about US $3 billion 
in  1998-99,  grew  to  US  $48  billion  in  2007-08, the  fastest  rate  of  growth  among  world 
markets BIS (2007). Growth in derivatives especially was strong, increasing to more than 
double spot transactions (Goyal, 2010).  
 
The  RBI  is  not  at  the  point  of  the  impossible  trinity,  where  monetary  policy  becomes 
ineffective, since the exchange rate is not fixed, and the capital account is not fully open. But 
it is a challenge to address the needs of the domestic cycle while managing external shocks. 
An important question is the impact of policy rates on the exchange rates. If this impact is 
low then rate change can be targeted to the domestic cycle. Alternative policy instruments are 
required  also  if  segmented  domestic  financial  markets  make  it  difficult  to  close  interest 
differentials  or  differences  in  domestic  and  international  policy  cycles  require  positive 
differentials. The latter became obvious in the exit from crisis policies emerging markets 
faced inflation while mature markets still battled deflation. As larger FX market turnover and 
rapid  market  deepening  makes  standard  intervention  less  effective, c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c o u l d  
offer an additional instrument to policy. 
 
Evidence on Central Bank (CB) communication, largely for developed countries, is surveyed 
in  Blinder  et.  al.  (2008).  They  argue  that c o m m u n i c a t i o n  m a k e s  m onetary  policy  more 
                                                 
2 For example, there is no longer automatic financing of the fiscal deficit. 
  2effective either by creating news, or by reducing noise when the economic environment or 
the policy rule is not stationary so there is learning
3. In such an environment expectations 
cannot be rational. In addition there can be asymmetric information between the public and 
the CB. Since uncertainties are pervasive in emerging markets, communication should have a 
larger effect there.  
 
According to Posen (2002) CB transparency can work in a number of ways depending upon 
how effectively CB is able to maintain credibility and how public expectations are formed. 
He  discusses  six  basic  positions  on  CB  transparency/communication:  Reassurance  view, 
detailed  view,  irrelevance  view,  contingent  view,  annoyance  view a n d  d i v e r t i n g  v i e w .  
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) conclude that not only does CB communication matter but its 
timing also plays a crucial role. Communication becomes intense before any monetary policy 
meeting to prepare the market for the forthcoming decisions. Fratzscher (2005) analyzed the 
effect of oral as well as actual intervention on exchange rate levels using time series and 
event study analysis for US. He found oral interventions to be highly successful in moving 
exchange  rate  in  the  desired  direction  as c o m p a r e d  t o  a c t u a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n s .  G o y a l  et.  al. 
(2009)  demonstrate  this  theoretically,  and  present  some  evidence  for  India  in  a  study  of 
strategic interaction between monetary policy and FX markets. Egert (2007) studies the effect 
of forex interventions along with the effect of interest rate news and verbal communication 
on exchange rate level and volatility for emerging markets in European union using event 
study analysis. He found that appropriate CB communication enhances the effect of actual 
intervention and interest rate news since each measure amplifies the effect of the others. 
Fatum (2009) analyses the impact of official Japanese intervention on JAP/USD exchange 
rate. He found portfolio balance channel more effective compared to signaling channel. Fišer 
and  Horváth  (2010)  show  that  Czech  National  Bank  communication  tends  to  decrease 
exchange rate volatility using a GARCH framework. A lot of work has been done to analyse 
the  effect  of  CB  communication  on  financial  markets.  Literature  on  the  effect  CB 
communication on exchange rates, to which our paper contributes, is still in a nascent stage, 
especially for emerging markets.   
 
                                                 
3 Empirical literature studying CB communication has grown rapidly in the last decade, as conventional wisdom 
in CB circles changed from saying as little as possible to the importance and the art of managing market 
expectations. Communication has become an important part of monetary policy.  
  3The basic question we address is ‘What is the impact of various types of intervention (verbal 
and actual) and monetary policy measures on Indian  exchange  rate  volatility  and  level?’ 
Policy measures are classified as follows:  
-Interest rates: Reverse repo rate, repo rate 
-Quantitative variables:  Intervention, liquidity absorption or injection, cash reserves 
-Communication variables: Review, speeches 
-Controls:  News, interest rate differential, US Federal Open Market Committee Meetings 
 
Since our aim is to study the effect of all these variables on the exchange rate, time series 
modeling is most appropriate. In event study analysis one can only ascertain the impact of 2-3 
variables at a time and the result is highly influenced by subjective judgment.  
 
We find foreign exchange (FX) market intervention to be one of the most effective of the CB 
instruments  evaluated  for  the  period  of  analysis.  It  decreases  volatility  at  both  daily  and 
monthly frequencies. Announcements on reserve requirements decrease volatility in the short 
period but both announced and actual changes raise it over time.  Higher charges for liquidity 
injection increase monthly volatility, whereas higher payments for liquidity absorption reduce 
volatility at both frequencies. Interestingly more news decreases daily volatility. Interest rate 
differential increases volatility. There is also evidence of US monetary policy announcements 
impacting domestic markets, increasing daily variance but decreasing it at the monthly level. 
Speeches  decrease  daily  volatility,  but  review  has  the  opposite  effect  at  the  monthly 
frequency.  
 
Since the exchange rate is a managed float we also test if policy dummies affect the exchange 
rate itself, and find evidence of this. CB intervention effectively appreciates the exchange 
rate, as do speeches at the daily frequency although this may be capturing the effect of large 
inflows occurring during our data period. At a monthly level, review and higher interest rate 
differential  depreciate  the  exchange  rate.  The  latter’s  negative  effect  on  expected  future 
returns  maybe  discouraging  inflows  more  than t h e  h i g h e r  c u r r e n t  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e n c o u r a g e s  
them. US Federal Reserve announcements appreciate the daily level. The results imply that 
communication channels have potential but are not being used effectively. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 discuses data and methodology followed by 
section 3 which analyses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
  4 
2. Data and Methodology 
We use both daily and monthly data. The daily data set is from 1
st November 2005 to 31
st 
December 2008, giving a total of 1157 observations. The monthly data set is from January 
2002 to December 2008, that is, a total of 84 observations. We have enough observations to 
carry out time series analysis both in the daily and in the monthly case. The monthly data 
period starts with the adoption of LAF
4, while the daily data period covers a time of large 
exchange rate volatility, when the LAF had reached greater maturity.  The daily frequency is 
required  since  markets  may  take  several  days t o  a b s o r b  t h e  n e w s ,  w h i l e  t h e  m o n t h l y  
frequency picks up greater strategic interaction, feedback and simultaneity. Moreover, the 
RBI does not release high frequency intervention data, therefore the impact of published 
intervention data can only be examined at the monthly frequency. Data sources are given in 
Appendix A. 
 
GARCH models for exchange rate returns at the m onthly and daily frequency provide a 
measure of exchange rate volatility. A number of models were estimated by maximizing the 
log-likelihood through an iterative process
5. The best were selected based on diagnostics such 
as  AIC,  SIC
6,  F-tests,  and  the  Q-test
7.  The  models  cannot  be  arbitrarily  fitted. 
Autocorrelation has to be taken care of, along with the concerns for degrees of freedom. Both 
monthly and daily data have different characteristics and they bring out different aspects of 
the market. 
 
The best fitting models selected are given below.  
 
AR (3) GARCH (1,1) for daily data: 
                                                 
4 Therefore observations prior to 2002 could not be used also due to non-availability of certain variables. 
5 Estimation was done in Eviews using both the Marquardt and the BHHH algorithms. The results with BHHH 
were   
more stable and robust. E. Berndt, B. Hall, R. Hall, and J. Hausman developed BHHH. It uses only the first 
derivatives of the objective function during the iteration process. In most cases it gives better results compared 
to Marquardt. 
6 The lower are AIC and SIC the better the model, since the tests are based on the residual sum of squares. 
6 This checks the null hypothesis that there is no remaining residual autocorrelation, for a number of           
   lags, against the alternative that at least one of the autocorrelations is nonzero. The null is rejected for     
   large Q values. 
 
  5                             Mean equation  ti t
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AR (1) and GARCH (1, 1) for the monthly data: 
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            Variance equation 
Both  these  specifications  make  residuals  and  squared  residuals  white  noise,  implying 
unmodelled autocorrelation is not left in the data. Taking first differences eliminated the unit 
root in levels. The mean equation estimates the first difference of the log exchange rate (a 
measure of exchange rate returns). The constant term c gives the average rate of depreciation 
or appreciation. Daily data requires three lagged terms in mean equation whereas monthly 
equation requires only one. The GARCH model then specifies the conditional variance   of 
the  error  term 
2
t V
t H .  It  includes  a  constant,  lagged  error  variables  (ARCH  terms),  lagged 
conditional  variance  (GARCH  term),  and  a  number  of  variables  capturing  central  bank 
actions  (CBit).  The  interest  differential  (intdifft),  a  news  variable  (dvnewst),  and  US  CB 
announcements  are  controls  variables  constituting  the  environment  in  which  the  CB  and 
markets act and react. 
 
Since the Indian policy objective is to reduce exchange rate volatility, including all these 
monetary policy variables allows us to test their relative effectiveness. That is, do they reduce 
exchange rate volatility or further aggravate it? As CB intervention creates news, volatility 
can  be  expected  to  increase  in  tick-by-tick d a t a .  B u t  o v e r  l o n g er  periods  the  CB  may 
successfully  reduce  volatility.  Especially  if  information  is  scarce  more  news  can  reduce 
volatility. 
 
 In mature markets, the exchange rate is expected to be a random walk around equilibrium 
levels. But in emerging markets with large reserve accumulation, the exchange rate regime is 
more properly a managed float. So, although affecting the exchange rate level is not a stated 
  6policy  objective,  it  is  worthwhile  to  check  if t h e  p o l i c y  d u m m i e s  a f f e c t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  
exchange rate.  
 
The policy dummy variables included in CBit are: 
 
dvacrrt - It is the dummy variable, which takes value 1 when any change in the cash reserve 
ratio  (CRR),  commercial  bank  reserves  with  the  RBI,  is  announced  by  the  RBI  or  is  0 
otherwise. 
 
dvecrrt –This dummy variable takes value 1 when CRR change effectively comes into force 
or is 0 otherwise. 
 
dvrept-  This  dummy  variable  takes  the  value  1  when  the  repo  rate  is  changed.  It  is  0 
otherwise. The repo rate, the upper bound of the liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) corridor, 
is the rate at which RBI lends in the LAF. 
 
dvrevt-This dummy variable takes the value 1 when the reverse repo rate is changed or is 0 
otherwise. The reverse repo rate is the rate at which the RBI absorbs liquidity in the LAF, 
thus constituting the lower bound for the LAF. 
 
dvreviewt- It takes value 1 whenever RBI reviews policy and makes a policy announcement, 
and is 0 otherwise. Prior to 2005, RBI used to review once in 6 months, after that the 
frequency was increased to once in three months. 
 
Weighted dummy variables: 
 
speechest - It is a categorical variable taking different values depending on which RBI top 
official has given a speech and when the comments on the economy or on policy were made. 
It takes the value 3 when the RBI governor gives a speech and 4 when this speech is given 
within a week before or after the meeting. It takes value 1 when any of the three deputy 
governors gives a speech and 2 when a speech is given within one week before or after the 
meeting. 
 
  7wtlafpst- It is purchase minus sale in repo/ reverse repo auctions in LAF, that is, net injection 
(+)  minus  net  absorption  (-)  of  liquidity  by  RBI.  We  use  it  as  an  instrument  for  daily 
intervention because intervention changes domestic liquidity, which requires to be sterilized. 
Especially in our data period, since inflows were high, and LAF absorption was extensively 
used to mop up liquidity. wtlafpst takes value 0 when intervention is 0, value –1 when it is 
between -39500 and 0, and value –2 when it is less than -39500. Similarly, for adjustment 
greater than 0 and less than 39500 it takes value 1 and greater than 39500 it takes value 2.  
 
wtintvnett-  Intervention,  defined  as p u r c h a s e  m i n u s  s a l e  o f  USD,  takes  value  0  when 
intervention  is  0.  For  intervention  between  -6812  and  less  than  0  it  takes  value  –1.  For 
intervention less than -6812 it takes value -2. Similarly, for intervention greater than 0 and 




Intratet -This cluster variable is a combination of repo and reverse repo changes. It takes 
value 0 when none of them change, 1 when either of the two changes and 2 when both 
change together. 
 
Commt –As the name suggests, it is a communication variable, which combines domestic 
communication variables. It is a combination of reviewt and speechest . If neither change it 
takes value 0, when either or both of them change it takes different values depending upon 
who made the speech and when (as described earlier).  
 
Quantt - It combines quantitative variables dvecrrt, dvacrrt with wtlafpst for daily regressions 
and with wtintvnett for monthly regressions. If neither of the variables changes it takes value 
0, if one of them changes it takes value corresponding to that variable. If two change together 
it simply adds up the values taken by those two variables. Similarly, when all of them change 
together (dvecrrt and dvacrrt are dummy variables but wtlafpst and wtintvnett are weighted 
variables.) 
 
Macroeconomic control variables: 
 
  8dvnewst -The daily specification includes a macroeconomic news variable (dvnewst). This 
was constructed as a dummy variable taking a value of unity on the days macroeconomic 
news on production or pricing is released on government and RBI websites.  
 
intdifft  -The  interest  rate  differential  is  defined  as  the  difference  between  the  Indian  call 
money  rate  (cmr)  and  the  US  federal  fund  rate  (ffr).  This  captures  the  fundamentals 
determining the short-term exchange rate based on uncovered interest parity under the asset 
approach to FX markets. 
 
dvfomct-This stands for the US federal open market committee meeting which takes place 8 
times a year. Whenever this meeting takes place this dummy variable takes the value 1, and is 
0 otherwise. 
 
Descriptive statistics (Table A1a and A1b in Appendix B) show the daily call money rate on 
an average exceeded the federal fund rate by about 2.5 percentage points and monthly call 
money rate by 3.21 percentage points. Since wtlafpst is negative, on an average liquidity was 
sucked  out  of  the  economy  for  the  period,  indicating  sterilization  associated  with 
accumulation of foreign currency. The frequency of RBI meetings is less than half of that of 
federal open market committee meetings (dvfomct) and RBI communication through speeches 
almost matches that of macroeconomic news.  Mean  of  announcement  of  CRR  change  is 
lower than the mean of the effective implementation date. This is because implementation is 
generally  spread  over  a  longer  period  of  time,  normally  in  2-3  stages.  In  the  period  of 
analysis, the repo rate was changed more often compared to the reverse repo rate. The Jarque-
Bera test based on the 2
nd and 3
rd moments is large, showing severe non-normality, as is to be 
expected in daily and monthly data.  
 
The correlation coefficients (Table A2a and A2b) among the policy variables are not very 
large, but repo, reverse repo rate changes and announcements do tend to be clustered with the 
policy review meetings. The highest correlation of 0.4 between wtlafpst and intdifft suggests 
that  when  interest  differentials  are  large  absorption  is  required  to  offset  the  impact  of 
arbitraging  inflows.  Correlations  are  higher  at  the  monthly  frequency.  Large  correlations 
  9imply multicollinearity in the regressions
8. So, as a further caution we run regressions with 
the  dummy  variables  one  by  one,  in  clusters  and  all  together,  subjected  to  the  control 
variables. We also use many weighted dummies. 
 
3. Empirical Results and Analysis 
Table 1 summarizes the policy instruments that are significant, and gives their signs. It also 
allows us to see how the monthly affect, which allows for policy feedback and simultaneity, 
differs from the short-run daily effect. The estimations are reported in Appendix C tables, 
with the equations estimated in each case given above the tables.    
 
Multicollinearity issues from using many dummy variables are ruled out since results with all 
the  dummies  are  largely  consistent  with  regressions  of  the  dummy  clusters  and  of  each 
dummy alone with controls. Regressions were repeated in each case for all variables together, 
dummy clusters, and each dummy alone with controls
9, if the controls were significant. The 
many regressions estimated all generally support the coefficients in Table 1 (the bracketed 
terms in Table 1 are the only case where they differ). Thus the results are robust. 
 
Variables, which measure quantitative FX market intervention, such as wtlafpst and wtintvnett 
have meaningful impact in all their relevant categories. Thus wtlafpst reduces daily variance 
and  appreciates  the  daily  exchange  rate,  while  wtintvnett  reduces  monthly  variance  and 
appreciates the monthly exchange rate. The sign of the cluster variable quantt is same as the 
FX market intervention variables, which dominate in a regression of the quantt variable with 
controls (Table A3 and A6).  
 
Most studies of an earlier period find that RBI intervention decreases volatility (Edison et. al., 
2007, Pattanaik and Sahoo, 2003, Goyal
10 et. al., 2009). Goyal et. al.(2009) find in addition, 
that daily FX market turnover increases with RBI intervention. In informal conversations, FX 
dealers often suggest that RBI intervention can increase FX market activity. Dealers with 
private information, who anticipate RBI action and its effect on the exchange rate, would use 
                                                 
8 If two variables are perfectly correlated, variance becomes infinity. So significance is low even if R
2 is high, 
the results are dependent on the data set, and coefficients can have the wrong sign or size. Multicollinearity is a 
common problem when a large number of dummy variables are used. But many of our dummies are weighted 
variables. Moreover, highest VIF was only 1.4 suggesting very low multicollinearity in our data set. 
9 Regressions were also done without controls but were discarded since the policy variables would then be 
affected by the omitted variables bias. 
10 While the earlier two studies use OLS, this study uses GMM, controlling for simultaneity. 
  10this to buy or sell, making money at the expense of less informed market participants. Any 
shock/new information to markets would increase expected returns and therefore volatility in 
high frequency data capturing actual trades. This is the creating news function of CB action. 
But studies show that in longer horizons the effect can be in either direction (Blinder et. al, 
2008). In the long run no news remains unprocessed. In the net CB action enhanced scarce 
news and decreased the volatility of returns.  
 
In the Goyal et. al.(2009) study, the CB’s reported intervention does not affect exchange rate 
levels. But a broader measure of the CB’s actions in the FX market, the change in reserves, 
depreciates the exchange rate. Our weighted dummy intervention variables are also, in a 
sense broader measures, since they give the same value to blocks of intervention.  So their 
significant effect on levels is consistent with the earlier result. The Goyal et. al. study was 
able to control for turnover, since it used a simultaneous equation technique. So it found that 
reserve  accumulation  depreciated  the  exchange r a t e .  T h e  n e g a t i v e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  t h e  
intervention dummies here maybe capturing the fact intervention was going on when high 
inflows were appreciating the exchange rate. High frequency data on foreign inflows is not 
available to serve as a control.  
 
Quantitative  intervention  in  the  money  market,  through  changes  in  the  cash  reserve 
requirement imposed on banks, has effects that are reversed over longer horizons. Although 
announced CRR (dvacrrt) decreases daily variance (Table A3), dvacrrt and effective CRR 
(dvecrrt)  both  increase  monthly  variance  (Table  A5).  This  interesting  result  possibly 
highlights limitations of blunt quantitative instruments. In the longer period markets may be 
able  to  get  around  restrictions,  and  overreact, o r  t h e  b u l k  a d j u s t m e n t s  r e q u i r e d  m a y  b e  
obstructing  smooth  market  adjustment.  That  dvecrrt d o e s  n o t  e f f e c t  d a i l y  v a r i a n c e  w h i l e  
dvacrrt d o e s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  s i n c e  m a r k e t s  r e a c t  t o   the  announcement,  the  action  itself  is 
ineffective. 
 
Among  communication  variables,  speechest ( w h i c h  c a n  b e  m e a s u r e d  o n l y  a t  t h e  d a i l y  
frequency) is persistently significant, appreciating the daily exchange rate and decreasing its 
variance. An interesting observation is that speechest becomes insignificant if the control 
variable news is dropped. Therefore speechest can be said to be playing an important role in 
interpreting and moderating the impact of news on the markets. This reflects the credibility of 
the RBI and the weight given to its pronouncements by public due to its strong balance sheet 
  11and  reserves.  Dvreviewt h a s  n o  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  d a i l y  f r e quency.  It  increases  variance  and 
depreciates  the  exchange  rate a t  t h e  m o n t h l y  f r e q u e n c y .  This  may  be  because  Indian 
monetary policy announcements provide no guidance on the exchange rate beyond saying it 
is market determined, and the CB will intervene to prevent excess volatility
11. The results 
imply an ineffective use of the communication channel with respect to the exchange rate 
since  the  statements  or  non-statements  with  respect  to  the  exchange  rate  are  increasing 
monthly volatility against the CB objectives. Dvreviewt affects the exchange rate but it is not 
used properly. As a result, the cluster variable commt, which measures the combined effect of 
speechest and dvreviewt, appreciates the daily exchange rate and decreases its variance, but 
has exactly the reverse effect at the monthly frequency
12.  
 
The speechest dummy includes weights for when it is made and who makes it. Its significance 
therefore suggests that both timing and source matter. Timing matters as part of the speechest 
implies that RBI’s future course of action triggers expectations and market actions.  
 
Of the LAF interest rates, the reverse repo (revt, henceforth), which is the daily rate at which 
the CB absorbs liquidity from the market, works in the same direction as wtlafpst to decrease 
daily variance (Table A3). This is intuitive since revt is the daily rate at which the CB absorbs 
liquidity from the market while wtlafpst measures the actual absorption of daily liquidity. The 
LAF rates do not affect levels (Tables A4, A6), revt and repot have opposite effects on 
monthly variance, while the first continues to decrease it, the second (or the rate at which 
liquidity is injected into the money market) increases it (Table A5). But revt and repot 
significantly affect monthly variance only in a regression with all variables together, and not 
when each is taken alone with the control variables. Therefore the combined variable intratet, 
which has both the LAF rates together, is not significant. 
 
                                                 
11 Thus quoting from monetary policy announcements which is our dvreviewt variable, RBI (2003): “India’s 
current exchange rate policy…has focused on the management of volatility without a fixed rate target and the 
underlying demand and supply conditions are allowed to determine the exchange rate movements over a period 
in an orderly way (pp.4).” RBI (2010) displays the continuity: “Our exchange rate policy is not guided by a 
fixed or pre-announced target or band. Our policy has been to retain the flexibility to intervene in the market to 
manage excessive volatility and disruptions to the macroeconomic situation (pp.9).” 
12 Egert (2007) points out that when actual and verbal communication comes together they increase the 
effectiveness of central bank actions. Fratzsher (2004) finds communication can be either a complement or a 
substitute for intervention. But in this case since the two act in opposite directions communication is not serving 
as either category.  
  12The effect of interest rates on exchange rates comes through the control variable intdifft, 
which increases both daily and monthly variance and depreciates the monthly exchange rate. 
Since Indian call money rate (cmr) normally exceeds the federal funds rate (ffr), arbitraging 
inflows are expected to raise volatility. However, it is interesting to note that Indian capital 
account  controls,  including  limits  on  bank  open  positions  are  unable  to r e s t r i c t  a r b i t r a g e  
sufficiently  to  make  the  variable  insignificant. T h e  v a r i a b l e  a l s o  d e p r e c i a t e s  t h e  m o n t h l y  
exchange rate, while the UIP alone should imply appreciation. Thus implying that negative 
effects of high interest rates on growth may be dominating, reducing inflows and depreciating 
the  exchange  rate.  Quantitative  credit  restrictions,  higher  interest  differentials  and  policy 
lending rates maybe worsening prospects of the real economy.  
 
The LAF policy rates largely influence exchange rates through their effects on cmr. Separate 
additional  effects  through  the  repo  and  reverse  repo  rates  are  minimal.  The  interest 
differential, which represents arbitrage opportunities and therefore induces markets to create 
liquidity, raises volatility in the short period as well as in the long run (Tables A3, A5). This 
implies  that  Indian  regulatory  restrictions  to l o w e r  b a n k  a r b i t r a g e  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  i n t e r e s t  
differentials are not effective.  
 
Table 1: Summary of results 
  Daily  Monthly 
  Variance  Mean  Variance  Mean 
quantt -  -  -  - 
commt   -  +  + 
wtlafpst -  -     
wtintvnett     -  - 
dvacrrt -    +   
dvecrrt     +   
speechest -  -     
dvreviewt     +  + 
dvnewst -       
intdifft +    +  + 
dvfomct +  -  -   
rev  -    (-)   
repo      (+)   
         
Note : The dvnewst and speechest variables could not be constructed for the monthly frequency. wtlafpst is only for the daily 
frequency and wtintvnett for monthly. The bracket ( ) indicates the variables were significant with all the dummy variables 
together but not alone with controls. 
 
US monetary policy announcements have a large effect on Indian exchange rates, presumably 
through their effects on inflows and other market expectations. They increase daily variance 
  13and appreciate the daily exchange rate, but decrease monthly variance. Significant dvfomc t 
gives support to Indian policy makers’ worry that markets get too much influenced by US 
policy. The immediate impact raises volatility. But in the long run, at monthly frequency, as 
dvfomct policy actions become clearer and as market digests news then it tends to reduce 
volatility (Table A3, A5). It could be adjustments to the policy announcements are completed 
over the longer time period. 
 
The control variables capture the environment in which the other policy actions have to 
operate. Although traditionally news is supposed to increase volatility in markets, Fišer and 
Horváth (2010) find that it reduces volatility in Czech Republic. They argue that since 
information is scarce in emerging markets news calms them. In our study also the sign of the 
coefficient on news (dvnewst) is consistently negative. Therefore the creating news function 
of CB communication could also be reducing noise in emerging markets.            
 
The results from putting the dummy variables in the mean equation are reported in Tables A4 
and A6 for daily and monthly data respectively. Many of the dummy variables turn out to be 
significant in both the regressions, implying that despite contrary statements in monetary 
policy  reviews  RBI  actions  do  affect  the  level  of  the  exchange  rate.  The  effects  are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
4. Conclusion   
In our tests of policy actions on exchange rate mean and volatility, using policy dummies in a 
GARCH framework, FX market intervention and communication outperform more traditional 
policy  variables.  This  supports  the  Blinder  et.  al  (2008)  position  that  in  a  climate  of 
uncertainty CB actions matter.  
 
As  a  consequence  of  steady  deepening  of  FX  and  money  markets,  while  quantitative 
interventions  continue  to  be  important,  communication  can  serve  as  a  focal  point, 
coordinating the actions of market participants (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). In particular, these 
variables allow the achievement of stated CB objectives either when interest rates alone have 
perverse effects because of differentials being affected by risk premia or when segmented 
domestic markets or asynchronous domestic cycles make it difficult to close the differentials.  
 
  14Given that the stated CB objective is to reduce volatility, blunt quantitative actions such as 
cash reserves have perverse effects. A positive interest differential increases volatility and 
does not strengthen the long-run exchange rate. News tends to calm markets, suggesting that 
in  emerging  markets  news  may  be  at  less  than o p t i m a l  l e v e l s .  T h i s  g r e a t e r  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  
combined  with  a  credible  CB,  gives  CB  communication  a  lot  of  potential.  But  it  is 
underutilized in our period of analysis. Communication and FX market intervention not only 
affect exchange rate volatility but also mean levels despite policy statements that there is no 
target exchange rate. It follows that policy makers would gain by investigating and evaluating 
the impact of alternative instruments, one by one and together. The communication channel 
needs to be further studied, developed, and used more intensively.   
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Appendix A: Data sources 
Interest rate differential- www.rbi.org.in and www.federalreserve.gov
Repo rate- www.reuters.com
Reverse rep rate-  www.reuters.com
Cash reserve ratio (Announcement + effective implementation)- www.rbi.org.in
Liquidity adjustment facility-www.rbi.org.in
Speeches-www.rbi.org.in press releases 
Timing-www.rbi.org.in archives 






Appendix B: Descriptive statistics and correlation 
 
Table A1a: Daily Descriptive Statistics 
  mean  median  max  min  std dev  skewness  kurtosis  Jarque 
Bera test  probability 
lnext 3.77  3.79  3.92  3.67  0.06  0.01  -0.96  44.44  0 
fdifft 0.003  0  1.2  -1.44  0.17  0.08  12.56  7528.54  0 
dvacrrt 0.009  0  1  0  0.09  10.63  111.19  612595.6  0 
dvecrrt 0.01  0  1  0  0.11  8.62  72.46  265227.7  0 
wtlafpst -0.23  0  2  -2  1.01  0.76  2.37  20  0 
dvrevt 0.003  0  1  0  0.06  16.94  285.49  3950434  0 
dvrept 0.01  0  1  0  0.10  9.68  91.83  420985.6  0 
speechest 0.23  0  4  0  0.73  3.33  10.01  7483.92  0 
dvreviewt 0.01  0  1  0  0.10  9.68  91.83  420985.6  0 
dvnewst 0.23  0  1  0  0.42  1.26  -0.42  326.18  0 
intdifft 2.45  1.76  35.2  -5.15  3.87  3.55  25.34  33108.35  0 
dvfomct 0.03  0  1  0  0.16  5.87  35.40  57075.3  0 
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Table A1b: Monthly Descriptive Statistics 
  lnext dvecrrt dvacrrt wtintvnett dvrevt dvrept fdifft intdifft dvreviewt dvfomct
mean  3.80  0.19  0.17  0.63  0.13  0.20  0.0001  3.21  0.25  0.69 
median  3.81  0  0  1  0  0  -0.002  3.31  0  1 
max  3.89  1  1  2  1  1  0.07  9.55  1  1 
min  3.67  0  0  -2  0  0  -0.04  -4.53  0  0 
Std dev  0.06  0.40  0.37  0.89  0.34  0.40  0.02  2.13  0.44  0.47 
skewness  -0.55  1.61  1.82  -0.87  2.23  1.51  1.48  0.11  1.18  -0.82 
kurtosis  2.61  3.49  4.20  3.20  5.79  3.19  8.60  3.28  2.33  1.68 
JarqueBera  4.67  35.62  49.84  10.66  94.21  30.86  137.51  81.35  20.22  15.61 




Table A2a: Daily Correlation Coefficients 
  dvacrrt dvecrrt wtlafpst dvrevt dvrept speechest dvreviewt dvnewst intdifft dvfomct
dvacrrt 1.00                   
dvecrrt -0.01  1.00                 
wtlafpst 0.02  -0.03  1.00               
dvrevt -0.006  -0.007  -0.04  1.00             
dvrept 0.27  -0.01  0.03  0.43  1.00           
speechest 0.06  -0.03  -0.08  -0.02  0.003  1.00         
dvreviewt 0.36  -0.01  -0.03  0.28  0.33  -0.03  1.00       
dvnewst -0.008  0.21  0.09  0.002  0.02  -0.04  -0.02  1.00     
intdifft 0.11  0.03  0.40  -0.01  0.09  0.0004  -0.02  0.02  1.00   





Table A2b: Monthly Correlation Coefficients 
  dvecrrt dvacrrt wtintvnett dvrevt dvrept intdifft dvreviewt dvfomct
dvecrrt 1.00               
dvacrrt 0.35  1.00             
wtintvnett 0.03  -0.03  1.00           
dvrevt -0.008  -0.07  -0.12  1.00         
dvrept 0.21  0.09  -0.33  0.24  1.00       
intdifft 0.24  0.18  -0.28  -0.06  0.33  1.00     
dvreviewt .07  0.26  -0.10  0.27  0.11  -0.14  1.00   
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  Table 3: Variance- daily 
  1  2  3 




















į 1(commt)  -0.0007*** 
(0.0002)     
į 2(quant)  -0.00033** 





-0.002   
(0.004)     
į 4(wtlaffps)      -0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
į 5(dvacrrt)      -0.009** 
(0.004) 
į 6(dvecrrt)      0.0043 
(0.004) 
į 7(dvrept)      0.004 
(0.006) 




į9(speechest)      -0.0008** 
(0.0004) 











  (0.005) 





(0.003)   





(3.74E-05)   





(6.19E-05)   
  L-B(10), STD RES   6.628  5.523  6.118 
  L-B(20), STD RES  30.252  22.113  26.134 
SIC  -1.077  -1.222  -1.083   
N  1157  1157  1157 
 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses), Ljung Box Q-statistics of the tenth lag of residuals and squared residuals 
are reported. ***,** and * denotes significance at 1%,5% and 10% level. 
 
  19Table 4: Mean- daily data   







(0.004)   














  (0.036) 







(0.039)    -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
į1(commt)         
  -0.005* 
(0.003) 
į2(quant)       
  į 3(intrates)        -0.008 






     
į5(dvacrrt)  0.008 
(0.090)   
 
   
į6(dvecrrt)  0.007 
(0.399)   
 
     
į7(dvrept)  -0.028 
(0.042)   
 
   
į8(dvrevt)  0.076 
(0.105)   
 
     
į9(speechest)  -0.010*** 
(0.0035)   
  -0.010*** 
(0.004)   
į10(dvreviewt)  -0.033 
(0.090)   
 
     
į11(dvfomct)  -0.0201 
(0.016)   




O1(intdifft)  -7.13E-05 
(0.0008)   
 
  -0.0007 
(0.00078)   
O2(dvnewst)  -0.008 
(0.008)   
  -0.009 
(0.008)   
L-B(10), STD RES   5.843  7.070 
 
               6.032  6.207 
L-B(20),STD RES  24.738  25.761  25.054  25.963 
SIC  -1.194  -1.201    -1.189  -1.190 
N  1157  1157    1157  1157 
 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses), Ljung Box Q-statistics of the tenth lag of residuals and squared 
residuals are reported. ***,** and * denotes significance at 1%,5% and 10% level, 
0 weakly significant, 
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Table 5: Variance- monthly 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 










































į1(commt)  0.0002* 
(9.07E-05) 
0.000198*** 
(6.02E-05)           
į2(quant)  6.17E-06 
(1.45E-05)    -5.97E-06
0 
(3.74E-06)         
į3(intrates)  -2.49E-05 
(4.60E-05)             
į4(wtintvnett)        -9.39E-06 
(1.67E-05)    -3.85E-05*** 
(5.08E-06)   
į5(dvacrrt)        -8.91E-05 
(9.95E-05)      0.00047*** 
(0.00014) 
į6(dvecrrt)        0.00011 
(8.76E-05)       
į7(dvrept)        7.59E-05*** 
(1.17E-05)       
į8(dvrevt)        -0.00012** 
(6.36E-05)       
į9(dvreviewt)        0.00016** 
(8.42E-05) 
0.000198*** 
(6.02E-05)     
 
































L-B(10), STD RES   8.374  6.077  7.705  6.714  6.077  9.08  8.888 
L-B(20), STD RES  26.050  25.204  27.622  21.448  25.204  24.78  26.702 
SIC  -5.020  -5.533  -5.554  -5.318  -5.533  -5.665 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses), Ljung Box Q-statistics of the tenth lag of residuals and squared residuals are reported. 
***,** and * denotes significance at 1%,5% and 10% level. 
0 weakly significant, p-value [0.111]. If regression 3 is done 
without controls quantt is strongly significant and positive. 
-5.723 
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Table 6: Mean- monthly data 
  1  2    3  4 

















į1(commt)  0.005** 
(0.002)   
 
 
   
į 2(quant)  -0.003*** 
(0.001)   
 
     
į3(intrates)  -0.0005 
(0.001)     
   




(0.001)     
į5(dvacrrt)    -0.001 
(0.003) 
 
   
į6(dvecrrt)    -0.001 
(0.003) 
 
     
į7(dvrept)    -0.0003 
(0.002) 
 
   
į8(dvrevt)    -0.0003 
(0.003) 
 
     
į9(dvreviewt)    0.004* 
(0.003) 
 
  0.005*** 
(0.001) 







0.001    (0.002) 






  0.0004 
  (0.001) 
L-B(10), STD RES   9.765  11.576  11.561  7.074 
L-B(20), STD RES  28.421  31.876    30.296  22.542 
SIC  -5.820  -5.800    -6.003  -5.908 
N  84  84    84  84 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses), Ljung Box Q-statistics of the tenth lag of residuals and squared residuals are reported. 
***,** and * denotes significance at 1%,5% and 10% level. 
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